We need to ask ourselves why our politicians and civil servants indulge in corruption, assuming that they are just like any of us, and like politicians of other countries. Certainly, economics as a field of study does not tolerate arguments based on assumptions that some people are innately corrupt and can never change their ways. Let us take a moment to get into the basics of accepting and giving bribes. A person accepting bribes compares the benefits of taking bribes with its costs. If the benefits exceed the costs, he accepts it; if it does not, he rejects it. Regardless of his race, place of residence, education, and his level of income, it is this cost and benefit analysis that determines whether he accepts bribes.
The negative consequences of abusing power have largely been absent in Nepal, and absolutely absent for the ones at the very top. This is why corruption has become a way of life.
Try giving 5,000 rupees to the police chief of Kathmandu to hush a murder, and he will throw you out of the room. Try giving him 5 million, and maybe he will think twice before being impolite to you. Try giving 50 rupees to motorcycle license granting operator to bend the rules for you, he will get offended. Try giving him 5,000 rupees, and he might actually bend the rules for you.
The same logic applies to those giving bribes. The person considering bribery does a cost-benefit analysis, and bribes only if the benefit outweighs the cost. This economic model stripped to its most basic form explains why corruption exists.
If we are serious about curtailing corruption, this is where the focus ought to be—on increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits of accepting bribes or abusing power for personal gain.
To decrease the benefits of indulging in corruption, many have argued that salaries need to go up. This may not be a smart way to curb corruption. Increasing the salary for those in authority will certainly make it more expensive to bribe them. But it may actually increase the rupees value of money bribed.
Just think about it. Suppose a license granting officer is salaried at 10,000 rupees, he may bend the rules for you for 5,000 rupees. If his salary were to be increased to 50,000 rupees per month, he will not bend the rules for 5,000 thousand, but will bend it for only 15,000 rupees. While there will be fewer people who can afford 15,000, the rupees value of total bribery may go up. Besides, it is very expensive for the government to hike salaries by such proportions.
The focus, therefore, ought to be on the cost side. We need to have a system in place that makes it difficult to accept bribes and abuse power, and increases the chances of catching them. When we do catch them, we need to prosecute and punish them. We need to do this publicly and harshly.
The negative consequences of abusing power have largely been absent in Nepal, and absolutely absent for the ones at the very top. This is why corruption has become a way of life. It is nothing to be ashamed of, and, in private, occasionally something to be proud of.
This culture isn’t surprising, though. We have a long legacy of our role models abusing power. Nepal’s laws and its institution were never meant to check the abuse of power by the powerful. These institutions were made by the powerful, for the powerful.
The writers and guardians of the Muluki Ain swore allegiance to the king not to ordinary citizens of Nepal. The idea was to keep the public happy enough using a carrot and stick approach to avoid revolution and in the meantime plunder the country’s resources. The new guardians of the system after 1990, realizing how wonderful the system served those in power, showed little interest in changing the system.
Call it shortsightedness, incompetence, or patronizing attitude towards the rest of the Nepalis, these freedom fighters never really understood why it was important to have laws and institutions that tied their own hands. Even today, there does not seem to be any desire to change the system when it comes to punishing those that abuse power.
I was not surprised to read what Surya Nath Upadhyaya, former chief of Commission for the Investigation of Abuse Authority (CIAA) wrote in Republica. Describing the most likely laws concerning CIAA in our soon to be written constitution, he writes, “The draft requires CIAA to place its investigation before the Attorney General (AG) for his advice and is bound to obey his/her direction as to whether and in what manner to proceed with the case. It cannot file the suit in the court independently.” This is like seeking permission from the suspect to prosecute. You don’t have to be an expert to see how lame this law is. Yet, most likely it will pass, because it works in favor of top political leaders, on whose “consensus” this constitution rests.
This is very unfortunate. Sadly, there is little common folks can do about it except protest. And, protest, we must. We need to advocate aggressively in favor of making the CIAA and Supreme Court fiercely independent, and make sure that they are staffed by the most competent men and women that our country has to offer. We need to make sure that these guardians of laws and the policeman for the government have financial as well as job security, and that they are answerable to nobody but a 2/3rd majority in the parliament.
(Writer is Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance at Texas A&M International University in Texas, US.)
680anand@gmail.com
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