Just look at where these actors were exactly a year ago. It was the MPRF push for an inclusion ordinance that provoked the Tharu groups to agitate. The Tharu alliance at that point included the strangest of partners. Laxman Tharu (an ex-Maoist from the west committed to militant movement), Raj Kumar Lekhi (UML activist from the east representing the oldest Tharu organization, Tharu Kalyankari Sabha), and Dilli Chaudhary (NC leader and social entrepreneur who runs the biggest NGO, BASE, in the west) came together to oppose being clubbed together with Madhesis. The movement led to a six-point government-Tharu pact, assuring them of inclusive and proportional representation in the state, and accepting their identity distinct from Madhesis.
Ironically, the Upendra-Laxman pact this week is to oppose any efforts to ‘divide Madhesis and Tharus’, and expresses a joint commitment to create ‘one Tarai’ with flexibility over its terminology. Has politics come around a full circle? How did the change happen in such a short span? What are the motivations of the actors? And what impact will it have on federalism debate and the larger political process?
Motivations
The first thing to recognize is that despite the antagonisms, Tharu and Madhesi leaders were always talking to each other. The Maoists had built up a Tharu-Madhesi alliance in the plains during the war. Many of the present leaders – Upendra, Laxman, Matrika Yadav, and Jai Krishna Goit – who represent different streams, have a common origin and knew each other.
Tharus came out in larger numbers during the first Madhes movement of 2007. Many Tharu leaders are in Madhesi parties even now, largely from the east but also a few from the west. Before the elections, there were serious talks between Laxman Tharu and different Madhesi party leaders about the prospects of an electoral alliance. And there was pressure from both Madhesi and Tharu civil society in Tarai towns for working unity between the two groups.
Over the past year, Madhesi-Tharu conversations have happened at several levels and brought together several points of convergence. Here is the common narrative many have arrived at. Madhesi leaders admitted they had become too arrogant after their movement and ignored Tharu concerns, and sought to impose their hegemony. The Tharus were right to assert themselves. But the older parties (particularly the UML) had further stoked this divide and benefited from it – a point the Tharus accepted. Both said, “We have a common enemy – the old Kathmandu establishment – and a common goal – federalism with strong autonomous states.”
This forms the philosophical basis for the present Upendra-Laxman unity. But at the core, there is a realpolitik calculation on both sides.
Upendra Yadav is out of the Kathmandu power calculus. The split in his party has affected the party structure at the local level. More importantly, Bijay Gachhedar – a key Tharu leader of the east – walking away meant that MPRF could no longer claim to be a party representing all communities in the Tarai. It was reduced to a party of Yadavs, with some other middle castes thrown in. Yadav’s efforts to cash in on the opposition sentiment in Tarai has fetched only limited dividends because of deep apathy and rising disillusionment with all the Madhesi parties. Out of government, and unable to muster wide popular support, the MPRF knew it needed a movement to retain its relevance and show its revolutionary pro-Madhes credentials.
The federalism map submitted by the CA committee provided an ideal opportunity to do so. Most Madhesi leaders who are in government informally admit that one Madhes is not possible. But no one is quite ready to bell the cat, for the fear of being accused of selling out is deep. They also do not see why they should relent at the present juncture – when negotiations on boundaries and powers to be granted to the state still remain. The idea is to stick to the demand till the very end, extract what they can, then blame Kathmandu for not granting powers and rights to Madhes, and go into the next polls on that agenda.
MPRF’s present design fits into this larger game of who is more radical than the other. They will make a concerted push to get a single state in the Tarai. But even if they do not get it, Upendra Yadav will be able to claim that he led a movement and got concessions in terms of more territory and power, while the other Madhesi parties were enjoying state power. This would, the calculation goes, strengthen the organisation, wean back people who have left, win over a partial Tharu vote base, and restore his importance in national politics. MPRF also has a support base in Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Kapilbastu, and Banke – sticking to the one state demand and allying with Tharus will also send a message to this constituency that the party is fighting for them, not dumping them.
Laxman Tharu has similar calculations, though he does not have the legitimacy of MPRF. Laxman carries the aura of being a Maoist rebel; he has managed to cultivate a group of young Tharus in west (especially Kailali and Dang); and he played an important part in the two Tharu agitations last year. But Laxman is still in the nascent process of establishing himself politically - either in terms of a wide mass base and organisation, or as a game changer in Kathmandu. The fact that he is not in the CA is an advantage because he can wash his hands off their decisions, but is a huge disadvantage because he is not taken as seriously as the other marginalized community leaders who have come through the electoral process.
The other problem for him is that he is bereft of a populist agenda. The Maoists – who continue to be the most powerful force in far west Tarai – have already expressed a commitment to a large Tharuhat state, west of Nawalparasi. Most Tharu leaders have informally admitted in the past that the best case for them is to win a province west of Dang – anything else is a bonus.
The alliance for Laxman is thus a chance to enhance his political importance, and distinguish himself from the Maoists – as someone who is fighting for a province that would unite Tharus from east to west. It will, he hopes, make him popular with eastern Tharus as well as western Madhesis. Any movement will force Kathmandu to negotiate with him seriously, thus improving his standing on the ground, and giving him a stature to compete with the Maoists. Laxman essentially wants to replicate what Upendra Yadav succeeded in doing in January 2007 and February 2008 – mount an agitation against Kathmandu; extract concessions and use it to expand on the ground; and then use it to win power in the capital.
Implications
The leaders of the alliance hope to whip up passions on the streets as the first draft of the constitution gets ready. The roadmap is simple – prepare for an agitation; expand their respective base tapping into each other’s strengths, say by Laxman speaking to a mixed rally in Lahan and Yadav speaking in Dang; make a push for a single province through a movement; simultaneously use the CA platform in the case of MPRF, forcing the other Madhesi parties to follow their lead; force the major parties to engage in negotiations; try to chop off the third province (Narayani) and divide Tarai into not more than two provinces as the endgame nears; extract more territory and powers for provinces; and claim victory or suppression depending on the outcome of talks and movement.
This does not necessarily mean that events will proceed accordingly. Several variables will matter. For one, national politics is fragile and whether the Maoist-non Maoist polarisation deepens or heads toward some kind of compromise will have an impact on Tarai politics.
Two, both Upendra Yadav and Laxman Tharu are at different stages of their careers. They share a Maoist background, but have contradictory orientations. Yadav has done his visceral anti-Maoist politics in the past, but now believes that a tactical alliance with them is necessary to bring about progressive change. Laxman’s main competition is the Maoists in the far-west and he has been amenable to allying with any force which would help him fight them. Both are also fairly vulnerable to co-option.
Three, the fragmentation of Tarai politics – on caste, ethnic, party lines – means that a broad Madhesi-Tharu alliance is not possible only with two leaders joining hands. For instance, Gachhedar continues to control pockets of Tharus in Morang and Sunsari; a chunk of Tharus in Saptari have just joined the Maoists, even as some others continue to maintain allegiance to the UML; Laxman’s base is still limited in the far-west where Maoists call the shots; the approach of Madhesi leaders in Rupandehi, Nawalparasi and Kapilvastu (Sarvendra Nath Shukla, Hridayesh Tripathi and others) who are in different parties is unclear. A mass movement will be possible only when a broader coalition across party lines emerges; an MPRF-TJSC grouping in itself may not be sufficient.
While the impact and even sustainability of the Upendra-Laxman pact has yet to be seen, the alliance will force other national, Madhesi and Tharu outfits to reassess their assumptions and calculations. It will also get Kathmandu to once again focus on the Tarai, instead of the sole focus on the Maoist-non Maoist dichotomy that marks present discourse. It will make it more difficult for observers and actors to think of Madhesis and Tharus as natural adversaries, who will be and can be pitted against each other. And it brings home the point, even more starkly, that the federalism debate is by no means over. As Nepal heads towards finalizing the constitution draft, welcome the season of more struggles, agitations, and negotiations.
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