Since the humiliating incursion of Chinese troops into India in 1962—the 'great betrayal' credited with sending Jawaharlal Nehru to an early grave—India has been paranoid about protecting its primacy in the Asian subcontinent. It wants to avoid the prospect of another 'Chinese encirclement' at all cost.In no other country has India been as determined to keep China at bay as Nepal, the heart of its old 'sphere of influence' spanning Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. So independent India, continuing on the path charted by the British, has been effectively guiding the political process in Nepal, starting with the restoration of King Tribhuvan in 1951. So secure was India about its continued primacy in Nepal it had begun to let its guard down. The feeling in New Delhi is that this momentary lapse in concentration has allowed the wily Chinese to outmaneuver India in its own backyard.
This explains India's petulant reaction to the new constitution. As SD Muni writes in the Economic & Political Weekly: "The Indian establishment got a feeling that while India was being ignored, lobbyists working on behalf of China and the European Union, and Christian groups were being accommodated [in the new constitution]." The old fears of encirclement came roaring back.
It is true that in two months leading up to the new constitution, China had been regularly sending high-level emissaries to impress their concerns on Nepali leaders. Above all, China didn't want 'ethnic states' in federal Nepal, which, it believed, would stoke similar demands in Tibet and Muslim-majority Xinxiang. The Chinese concerns were addressed in the six-state model (later amended to seven) largely based on economic 'viability' of individual states.
On the other hand, India's concerns over adequate representation of Madheshis in federal Nepal were ignored. India had backed the Madheshi parties' proposal for no more than two provinces in the Tarai belt, mostly along ethnic lines. But in the new federal map drawn up by the four big parties, the belt was divided between four separate provinces. This happened, in the reckoning of India, largely because China was able to take KP Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, its old allies in Nepal, into confidence.
The geopolitical ground has shifted. When Nepali leaders tried to play the infamous 'China card' in the past, India could safely ignore it. Almost all top politicians in Nepal were cogs in the vast Indian patronage network and New Delhi felt confident it could leverage past favors to secure its interests in Nepal. But with the constitution end-game in Nepal going so nightmarishly wrong, India can no longer as easily bat away threats of China card.
"China will surely take advantage [of the post-constitutional chaos]," a visibly panicky Yashwant Sinha, a senior BJP leader and ex-minister for external affairs, recently declared, "so India needs to stay alert." He was hinting at the rising anti-Indian sentiment in Nepal and the potential of the Chinese exploiting it. Later, Congress-I, the main opposition party in India, also expressed its displeasure over Modi's handling of Nepal, to China's clear advantage.
After the economic blockade, Nepali politicians, the same ones who once openly curried favors from New Delhi, have been emboldened to publicly disavow the 'special relationship' and promise closer ties with China. Nepal these days asks for clarification from the Indian envoy in Kathmandu; the Nepali ambassador in New Delhi feels emboldened to threaten fuel import from China.
This puts the Indian establishment in a quandary. On one hand, it believes Madheshis have legitimate grievances with Kathmandu and securing their rights in new constitution is in India's long-term interest. But imposing an economic blockade, the sledgehammer it has chosen for the purpose, has also resulted in unprecedented anti-India fervor, which, unlike what India has been given to believe, is not limited to the ruling hill elites. The antipathy for India is now pervasive. This is where China enters the picture.
The Indian establishment seems confident that China, now its largest trade partner, won't try to challenge Indian primacy in Nepal. This belief is rooted in history. Following China's invasion of Tibet in 1951 there was a tacit understanding that in return for India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, China would accept India's sway over (the then) three Himalayan kingdoms. This understanding holds to this day.
But after the recent economic blockade, the temptation for China to play the knight in shining armor who comes to Nepal's miraculous rescue is getting harder to resist. There are already worrying signs for India.
As it tightened the screws on Nepal, Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a veiled threat to India from the platform of the United Nations General Assembly. "All countries' right to independently choose social systems and development paths should be upheld," Xi Jinping told the UNGA. This rather generic statement would perhaps have gone unnoticed if the Chinese president's wording weren't so eerily similar to the China's statement welcoming the new constitution in Nepal. "China will support and respect Nepal's right to choose a system and development path," the statement had said.
No wonder Yashwant Sinha sounded so worried. Yes, China will still be reluctant to challenge India in Nepal. But what if China feels that continuing to limit its role in (strategically important) Nepal would be inimical to its own interests? During the last SAARC Summit in Kathmandu (less than a year ago) China, with the backing of Nepal, had pitched the improbable idea of its inclusion as a full SAARC member. India was horrified Nepal could even contemplate such a thing. Much has since changed.
Particularly since the ouster in August of its trusted ally Mahinda Rajapaksha in Sri Lanka and coming to power of Maithripala Sirisena who has emphasized closer ties with India, China has been busy searching for new friends in the Indian subcontinent. The old Nepali ruling elite, egged on by their electorate to seek closer ties with China post-blockade, fits the bill perfectly.
So what does this mean in practical terms? New impetus on development of the eight possible road link with Tibet; expansion of the Lhasa-Shigatse rail link to Kathmandu; preferential treatment for Chinese companies in key hydro and infrastructure contracts; and most crucially, revival of the Chinese oil pipeline idea, last scotched at the insistence of a furious India in 1990. These once unimaginable prospects are now being seriously contemplated.
China will never be able to match the extensive political, economic and people-to-people ties that exist between India and Nepal. Nor does China want such a dominant role in Nepal right now, not at the risk of alienating India.
But many believe the Indian blockade has permanently changed the rules of engagement between the three countries. The recent furor over the awarding of the Kathmandu-Nijgadh Fast Track to an Indian company and calls for awarding it to a Chinese company instead is a case in point.
For the first time in the 250-year history of unified Nepal, the threat of a China card actually being played against India appears credible. And India will only have itself to blame.
@biswasktm
Related story
PM Oli receives national identity card
