Democratic representation

SIZING-UP THE CA

A parliament made up of members elected by the people is a prerequisite to any democracy. While this is undisputed, what is less understood and more disputed is the parliament’s size—the number of representatives a parliament should have. Commonsense suggests this should depend on the size of the country—mainly population—which would imply that large countries have large-size parliaments and smaller countries have smaller parliaments. This perception is sensible but not quite true.

India has the largest population of all democratic countries, but its parliament has just 545 members. (Here we abstain from counting the upper houses of parliament which, in large part, are unelected.) However, mid-size countries like the UK, Germany, France, Italy, have larger parliaments than India, and even comparably smaller countries (Poland and South Africa) have parliament size close to that of the US.

REPUBLICA

Another way of comparing parliament size is to look at it as the ratio to total population, or number of people per parliament member. By this measure, India tops the list, with population of close to two million per member; US elects a representative for three quarters of a million; while Brazil elects one for every half a million. Overall, most of the world’s democracies elect a member for close to or over 100,000 people; a few countries elect a member for less than 50,000 people. The lowest number of people represented by a parliament member is for Ireland—just under 25,000.

Nepal’s case

The dissolved Constituent Assembly (CA) had 601 members, of which 340 were elected and 261 were nominated on the basis of proportional representation [PR] system, basically determined by the size of popular votes each party had received in the general election. Compared to the size of the country’s population of nearly 30 million, each CA member represented about 50,000 people which, as discussed above, is on the lower size of the representation scale.

Historically, this low-size representation has not always been the case. In the first general election held in 1959, the parliament size had been fixed at 109 members—all directly elected—for a population of about 10 million, which implied nearly 100,000 people per member. Parliament size was nearly doubled in the 1991 election to 205, which more or less kept unchanged the population per member ratio of about 100,000.

Increasing the parliament size comprising just the directly elected members to 340 during the 2008 CA election reduced the representation ratio to just over 80,000 but the number was still in line with past elections. Adding 261 nominated members to an already bloated parliament was a radical shift in the representation system.

Also Nepal seems different to other countries in terms of frequent changes in the number of parliament members—which has increased with each succeeding election. Looking elsewhere, the US House of Representatives number at 435 has been unchanged since 1911; and India’s at 545 members was fixed in 1950. Similarly, Britain’s at 659 seats and Japan’s at 480 have been maintained for decades. Of course, with rising population and, in some cases, expanding territory (the US), population-size per member have doubled or tripled over the past 50- or 70-year period but this hasn’t affected the parliament size for most countries.

Nepal thus presents a unique case for ever-changing parliament size which, however, has more to do with other considerations than population increase. Such “other considerations” has never been discussed publicly except in the context of 2008 CA election when the PR system was introduced. Primarily, the argument was that a second-layer of representation based on share of total electoral votes would more accurately reflect a party’s nationwide appeal and help parliament become more inclusive than under the traditional system of constituency-based majority voting.

Size matters

Nepal’s parliamentary experience can be analyzed in many ways but let us just focus on the size—should this be 100 or 200 or 600? Surprisingly, there is no agreement on an ideal size. Looking at the population measure, Nepal is definitely an outlier. Fifty thousand or less population per member is too small in the global context. Most countries of similar size have at least 100,000 population per member; larger countries have generally around 200,000-300,000 population per member. This global view makes a strong case for a drastic reduction of parliament size in Nepal, to the range of 100 to 200 members.

Besides global comparability, there is the question of manageability and work efficiency. The size of a deliberative body like parliament affects its productivity. Psychological studies confirm that work efficiency of individual members of a group—parliament or other such forums—diminish after the number reaches 100, and noticeably so after the 500-member threshold is crossed. There are obvious problems with managing large numbers, be that a factory, a club, or a parliament. Personal accountability is diminished; finding common ground for consensus becomes arduous; and partisan interests tend to sideline national interests. All these problems were apparent during the four years of CA’s operation that rendered it ineffective and an utterly useless.

Finally, size also matters for economic efficiency. While large size diminishes productivity, it adds to the cost. For large countries even with lavishly large parliament [Germany, Britain], the cost of running a legislature amounts to no more than a small fraction of the national economy. However, for a small and poor country like Nepal, sustaining a 600-member legislative body is a big burden on society, especially when parliamentary spending adds very little or nothing to national wellbeing.

Nepal’s choice

Our reckless use of the parliamentary system reflected, in main part, in the outsized choice of legislative body has rendered the task of governance much more difficult and, equally importantly, the cost of keeping the legislative infrastructure in place has been a drag on the national economy. Even with the background of disappointing performance of last CA—attributed mainly to its unwieldy size—there has been strong opposition to reducing the number to 491, comprising 240 elected members and 240 members nominated under the PR system, with the rest of 11 members probably being non-political appointees.

But the truth is that even a 491-member-size parliament will be too big, both efficiency and economy-wise. Effectiveness of national legislatures—or of deliberative bodies in general—diminishes with the size, after the optimum size has been reached. What will be the optimal size of legislative body for Nepal? Surprisingly, this important aspect has been little studied.

This is unfortunate, because the size of parliament needs to be looked at as the most prominent consideration for a workable democracy. Here, the small is beautiful and sensible. A small-size parliament will have a clear mandate and measurable accountability, to perform in the best interests of the nation and not to serve partisan and group interests. The latter orientation was quite evident in the last CA, with prominence given to regional, communal, and ethnic issues that, for most part, were at variance with national interest.

The global context makes a strong case for drastic reduction of parliament size in Nepal to 100-200 members.

From this perspective, the PR system, which is divisive and distortionary, must be done away with. For the vast leeway enjoyed by party leaders in the selection of MPs makes the parliament less than a truly democratic institution.

Rationality and cost considerations would favor cutting down the CA size drastically, say to 100. Such a small size would make the CA—and later the parliament—a truly national institution. In the main part, a smaller size parliament can become a platform to deliberate on national issues, balancing out the petty issues of ethnicity, regionalism, and indigenousness in a way that these become local level concerns where they rightfully belong.

The final point in the resizing the CA is the distribution of constituencies—the criteria to be used in the allocation of 100 legislature seats nationwide. The simple, sensible, and equitable arrangement will be to allocate each of 75 districts—large and small—one parliamentary seat which, among other things, will give all districts a direct stake in the federal union. The remaining 25 seats can be distributed among the largest 25 districts based on their population. Finally, in a situation of 50-50 tie-up in parliament, the President can be given the role of casting the tie-breaker vote, similar to the ex-officio vote cast by US Vice President when there is a stalemate in the 100-member US Senate.