The power is shifting in Asia, with potentially deep implications for regional and global security. In this so-called ‘Asian Century’, global security will increasingly depend on whether Asia’s powers can maintain stable security relations. While the whole world is concerned about how a ‘rising China’ will shape the world order, South Asia is primarily concerned with how China and India will fall out. China’s concern is the ‘arc of democracy’ that US is trying to build with Japan, Australia, India and other democratic countries to encircle China. New Delhi’s shift away from non-alignment and its growing strategic links with US brings it into play as an Asian balancer against China. India’s strategic interests will never align perfectly with the United States’, while its economic links with China continue to flourish.
However, there are fundamental areas of overlap, and Sino-Indian relations are strained by differences over borders, the Dalai Lama and Beijing’s patronage of Pakistan. To counter this strategy, China is developing its own grand strategy commonly known as ‘string of pearls’, where a ‘pearl’ is a sphere of influence seeded, secured, and maintained through the use of economic, geopolitical, diplomatic, or military means. The ‘string of pearls’ is about the dragon’s sea power and its emerging maritime strategy. India perceives ‘string of pearls’ as an encirclement strategy against it.
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While both China and India are competing for global and regional influence, they are also worrying about securing their interests in their close neighborhood. In the broadest sense, India and China share similar goals in Nepal. Each wants Nepal’s political situation to be stabilized and is watching closely as Nepal writes its new constitution. However, what each state regards as “stabilized” is different, and results in competing demands on Nepal. Historically, India considers Nepal to be under its security umbrella, which was institutionalized through a Nepal-India treaty in 1950. A provision in the treaty even provides India a ‘de facto’ say over Nepal’s security, be it in consultations about third country threats or acquisition of arms.
At present, India has a host of security concerns in Nepal, mainly illicit activities carried out through shared and open border. Moreover, India believes Nepal acts as a ‘strategic Himalayan frontier’ against possible Chinese threat. India perceives China as building strategic footsteps in Nepal by developing a rail link from Lhasa to Kathmandu, and placing its strategic nuclear warheads in Tibet. India perceives this as a part of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy.
All these factors have created significant insecurity in India, while China on the other hand is concerned about the role of US, European Union, and India in instigating the ‘free Tibet movement’ in Nepal and its impact on ‘territorial integrity’. Given the active involvement of India in the internal politics of Nepal, the US seeks to exert its influence over Nepal without alarming India. The US is trying to look for avenues that serve Indian interests while securing a niche for themselves. China sees Tibet as a strategic tool to contain it, and part of the strategy of ‘arc of democracy’ being played out in Nepal. Hence, China’s interest in Nepal rose significantly in the recent times, and China is determined to pursue the policy of containing ‘Free Tibet’ protests in Nepal at any cost. Additionally, China is worried about how a federal Nepal with the provision of ethnic self-determination will impact Tibetan nationalism. China fears instability in Nepal as a threat to its security interests.
It is clear that each country has its own interests in Nepal, which is not particularly favorable for Nepal and poses a challenge to Nepal’s sovereignty. Nepal is turning into a battlefield for international heavyweights, with weak domestic politics setting the stage. There can be no match between Nepal and China or between Nepal and India in terms of power configuration, e.g. territory, population, and economic and military strength. Diplomacy is the only mechanism left to Nepal. Nepal’s panchasheel foreign policy is not pragmatic enough in this changing context, and undermines the country’s ability to deal with rising powers. In this light, a new foreign policy approach, i.e. the formation of trilateral security cooperation, is required.
While much attention is devoted to the regional economic integration in South Asia, there is a lack of discourse on the need for a ‘cooperative security framework’ in the region. However, taking an initiative for the development of the South Asian regional security architecture is fraught with challenges. Hence, Nepal should limit its focus on the development of a trilateral security architecture. Although Nepal conducts bilateral security meeting with India and China respectively, it would be wise for Nepal to bring both the countries together in one forum and discuss their common threat perceptions in Nepal. The formation of ‘trilateral security cooperation’ is difficult, but a necessary foreign policy step for Nepal. For any regional security framework to be effective, the state needs to remain on top of this security architecture. The Nepali strategic community should act as a facilitator. There are some basic steps which need to be carried out for the institutionalization of ‘trilateral security cooperation.’
First, Nepali strategic community should initiate the formation of ‘Track II diplomacy’ where the proposal for the formation of ‘trilateral security cooperation’ should be discussed with Indian and Chinese strategic communities. A detailed research should be conducted on this proposal. Once track II diplomacy is formally established, major political leaders of Nepal should be made to embrace it as Nepal’s new foreign policy on a common platform. Thereafter, a series of high-level political visits should be held with Indian and Chinese leaders with the aim of taking them into confidence for the proposal. Next would be to ensure that this new foreign policy of Nepal is promulgated through the constitution. A close coordination with Nepali parliamentarians is required.
Lastly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs should coordinate with its respective counterparts in organizing ‘trilateral security dialogue’ with the main aim of resolving each other’s threat perceptions in Nepal. A regular meeting every three months at Foreign Minister level should be conducted and held in respective countries. To sum up, the formation of ‘trilateral security cooperation’ is complex and fraught with challenges, but is the only way forward for Nepal to address the different threat perceptions of its regional neighbors and maintain a balancing act in this complex strategic manuever.
The author is a researcher on security sector reform at Kathmandu School of Law. He has a Masters degree in Asian studies from Australian National University
rohit.karki@gmail.com
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