The Nov 1, 2011 Seven Point Agreement among the political parties settled four core issues related to integration of Maoist ex-combatants. As per the agreement, a maximum of 6,500 personnel would be integrated into Nepal Army; those interested would have to meet the standard norms of NA with some concessions on age (3 years), education level (one level) and marital status; each combatant had to individually meet the standards; and the highest rank would be that of the major, with the Special Committee to decide on the demand for some higher ranks. There was an agreement to pay Rs 5-8 lakhs in two installments to those opting for voluntary exit. There was also an agreement on creation of a new Directorate in the NA to accommodate the new recruits.
Integration and rehabilitation of such a large number of ex-combatants at 28 different locations was a management nightmare, considering the country’s difficult terrain, a difficult political environment and slack work culture. Logistic and manpower needs were huge. Careful and detailed operational planning and preparations were crucial. One small problem in one area could spread and delay or even derail the process.
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Yet following the political decision, the Secretariat (of the Special Committee) successfully completed re-verification and regrouping work at all seven cantonments and 21 satellite camps simultaneously: 17,052 Maoist Army Combatants (MACs) were re-verified and given new Special Committee ID cards, while 2,550 were found missing. Around 9,000 chose integration whereas little over 8,000 opted for voluntary exit in the first phase. Next phase of work reduced the number of camps to fifteen with the vacant camps handed over to the NA and the APF. The third phase comprised of the handover of weapon containers and perimeter security to the NA. Finally, a selection process ascertained the actual number of MACs opting and qualifying for integration. The rest were given bank checks for voluntary exit. The Secretariat completed its difficult responsibility without a major hitch and a vital part of Nepal’s peace process was completed.
In this huge, complex and sensitive task, if the role of the members of the Special Committee was important, the integrity, diligence, commitment and dedication of the members of the Secretariat was as vital. Their sense of mission overrode administrative hurdles, personal grievances and political differences. Operational know-how of the Coordinator, support of the members of the Secretariat and readiness of the staff to go beyond the call of duty were what made this project a success. The readiness of the security forces, the NA in particular, to meet its obligations on a short notice was admirable. The Chief Secretary (Member Secretary of the Special Committee) helped move things, which could otherwise have remained stuck in bureaucratic muddle. All in all, successful Integration and Rehabilitation (I&R) of the MACs proved that Nepalis are as capable in peace building as highly trained and experienced international experts.
But while the Special Committee’s role has come to an end, there are big challenges ahead. So long as the political transition does not come to a successful end, even the things we consider success today could unravel.
Transition has to be managed well and completed. Only then can the peace process be presented as a real success.
Conflicts in the post Cold War world are mostly internal and limited to the developing world, but the intellectual tools for conflict resolution and peace building have been developed elsewhere. The financial and operational leadership also come from mainly multinational arrangements or the UN. External roles interfaced with local interests can create problems of intellectual ownership, political leadership and operational expertise in the management, integration and rehabilitation of rebel army combatants. Initially, Nepal faced these problems as well. But political will driven by the power of ideas took back the intellectual ownership and made this part of Nepal’s peace process a nationally driven exercise. Finally, political leadership supported by operational/management expertise led to the success of the supervision, integration and rehabilitation (SIR) of the MACs.
Of course, Nepal’s political conflict is far from over. But with UCPN (Maoist) formally renouncing violence during its recent General Convention, and even the breakaway CPN-Maoist unlikely to resort to violence as an instrument of political change in the new scenario, the successful completion of the integration and rehabilitation process looks to have transformed the violent conflict into peaceful competition for power. But the political transition has to be managed well and completed soon. Only then can the peace process which ended the long years of violence and counter-violence causing so much pain and hardship to the Nepali people can be presented as a real success story and a model of peace building to conflict-torn societies around the world.
The author was a member of the Secretariat of the Special Committee for the Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army
This is the second of a two-part article. The first was published on April 17, 2013
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