It is said that intelligence is given to us by evolution but history is something we create for ourselves. Nepal created another piece of history as 70 former Maoist Army Combatants (MACs) were commissioned as officers of the Nepal Army (NA), in the final step of their integration and rehabilitation (I&R) on Monday.
Management, Integration and Rehabilitation (MIR) of rebel fighters are crucial but complicated parts of any post-conflict peace-building exercise. The Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation (SIR) of MACs proved difficult initially. The task which was supposed to take six months was eventually completed in six years. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was terminated primarily because of problems related to integration and rehabilitation. Had integration and rehabilitation been completed on time, perhaps the outcome of the last Constituent Assembly (CA) election and Nepal’s peace process would have been different. [break]
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Of the 19,602 MACs verified by UNMIN, 1,422 (70 officers and the rest in other ranks) who opted and qualified for integration into NA have completed training. 1,352 non officers have already been integrated, and the officers got their commission on Monday. They will be accommodated in the new NA Directorate created for the same purpose. Others have returned to civilian lives. Weapons from seven Maoist cantonments and 21 satellite camps are safely in possession of the state, and the Special Committee responsible for the SIR was dissolved after the completion of its work.
I&R has garnered widespread appreciation, both nationally and internationally. Some individuals have also been recognized and rewarded for what was a teamwork, with the most notable contribution made by the Special Committee and the Technical Committee. Be that as it may, people have started questioning the value of the peace process. Many have asked if it is really an achievement to send rebel fighters trained in the use of weapons back into society with generous cash packages. Others have wondered if it is wise to integrate politically indoctrinated cadres into national army.
These are complex questions without easy answers. A rebel army is created to destabilize society. A national army on the other hand is the ultimate guarantor of stability and security. This was the critical point of discussion with the Maoist members of the TC, Secretariat, and MAC Commanders. Though combatants may be good in military skills, the change in mindset, discipline and culture would be the crucial determinants of their integration. For four years, I was associated with this process. I was most closely associated with the First Division in Chulachuli, Ilam, as leader of the Secretariat team.
The change in combatants was very interesting.The former combatants have demonstrated the flexibility to qualify as disciplined personnel and officers of NA dedicated to peace, stability and security. As protectors of the people and society and defenders of the nation, they deserve our best wishes. Now they must be seen as respected officers and personnel of the NA, and not as former MACs. On their part, the newly commissioned NA officers and personnel must feel and act as such, and forget their previous incarnations.
Most crucially, the Maoist political leadership must not try to use them as cadres, but treat them as NA personnel.
The integration of MACs is an experiment based on peace, which has no price tag. CPN-Maoist has opposed integration and rehabilitation, calling it less than dignified. A section of former rebels have joined in their condemnation. That leaves us with the crucial question: why did this process succeed amidst uncertainties and complexities while politics as a whole is in crisis?
As I have written elsewhere, political problems have no technical solutions, and political leadership was crucial to this process. I&R was delayed because it got stuck between the two main international models: DDR or SSR. We resolved the problem by identifying four core issues—Numbers, Norms, Modalities, and Rank—on which political parties needed to agree, and eventually did.
In this complex and sensitive task, integrity, hard work, and dedication of members of the Secretariat played a crucial role. They created the environment for political leadership to take intellectual ownership necessary for decisive steps. Their sense of mission and commitment to the larger good overrode personal grievances, administrative shortcomings, and political differences.
This panel of experienced former security, diplomatic and civilian professionals and Maoist leaders/commanders understood the subject matter, its domestic and external complexities, and had the willpower to override personal gripes and managerial weaknesses. The coordinator’s experience and other members’ willingness to go beyond the call of duty were crucial. Readiness of security forces, especially the NA, in fulfilling the instructions given to them—often at the last minute—helped. The large number of hastily hired and trained field staff performed beyond expectations. On the whole, this project proved that Nepalis are capable of handling difficult tasks effectively.
The Secretariat enabled the political leadership to de-politicize, de-internationalize and de-bureaucratize this part of the peace process, whereas politics as a whole was stuck. This explains why the Special Committee was able to complete its mandate whereas the CA, representing the long held aspirations of the people and the central pillar of the peace process, was dissolved without completing the Constitution.
The trauma of transition and governance-deficit has frustrated many, leading them to question the value of peace and the significance of I&R of MACs. But Nepal has resolved its tragic insurgency in a relatively short time with limited damage. Of course, political conflict is far from over and the peace process is still in crisis. Despite some dilemmas, the real contribution of the successful I&R of the MACs is transforming Nepal’s violent conflict into peaceful competition for power, at least for now. Sadly, that process is at risk. If we are not careful, the mind, money, material and manpower responsible for even more painful conflicts elsewhere could operate here too. In that case, what we consider success today may unravel tomorrow.
The author was a member of the Secretariat of the Special Committee for the Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of the Maoist Army
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