Even though the release of disqualified ex-combatants have begun and is going smoothly, political negotiations are being continuously held among senior political actors to find consensus regarding their future and the numbers to be integrated into the national security agencies, particularly in the Nepal Army (NA). Basically, the PM’s proposed plan outlines three options for former combatants to chose from—politics, rehabilitation and reintegration. First, politics cannot be included as a part of the rehabilitation and reintegration package. In a democratic society, the option to join politics should be left to individuals and not imposed upon them.
Second, rehabilitation which includes skill-based training, formal and informal education, and financial incentives seem to be incomprehensive and shortsighted. The government cannot and should not guarantee lifelong livelihoods to people, including ex-combatants. It must, instead, focus on laying down the ground works for economic sustainability and aim to assist creating employment opportunities so that the combatants are not forced to join/form splinter groups and criminal gangs. Similarly, the plan should carefully consider political, economic and social aspects, emotional satisfaction and personal security.
Third, reintegration is always extremely important and a critical factor for ex-combatants and the state in post-conflict societies due to the attached emotional and political sentiments. In this complex scenario, rehabilitation and reintegration should be outlined without hurting the feelings of current security agencies and respecting the combatants’ positive contribution for the country. While this plan appears to be quite flexible regarding integration in Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and National Intelligence Department, or any other new security institutions, it is quite hesitant to accept them into the NA. Since UCPN (Maoist) want their soldiers to be integrated in NA due to political and strategic reasons, narrowing down their chances of doing so could be opposed by the combatants. This can easily obstruct their overall management, rehabilitation and reintegration.
Numerous arguments are made for and against integration of the former combatants, and timing for management. First, the anti-Maoist faction seeks a mandatory finalization of their future before the new constitution is made, but doing so undermines the basic thrust of CPA and constitution-making process. If this argument continues to dominate, completion of the new constitution itself could be postponed for an indefinite period of time. The constitution-making process and management of ex-combatants can be conducted simultaneously and should not interfere with each other. If former combatants are rehabilitated or integrated without due process, it will cause a serious setback to the peaceful transformation of the country, the ongoing peace process and activities of the Constituent Assembly.
Second, the anti-Maoist faction is also rooting for absolute rejection of ex-combatants being integrated into NA. This, again, could have negative consequence on the long-term political stability and peace. This argument seems to be formulated based on biasness and prejudice because the CPA presumes possible integration of ex-combatants in the NA, and other national security agencies. Therefore, a transparent process is essential to outline criteria for integration by keeping in balance politics and existing security establishment. Certain criteria must be formulated based on principles of flexibility, fairness and durable peace, and those combatants willing to join the national security agencies must fulfill the minimum standards.
Third, the hard-line demand of UCPN (Maoist) for integrating their cadres in the NA en masse is not justified, and will prove costly and inappropriate. This idea establishes an extremely negative precedence and could push the country towards militarization. It is neither possible for the country nor can ever be considered economically viable in a post-conflict nation like Nepal. The UCPN (Maoist) leadership should display high flexibility during the preparation of strategies for rehabilitation and reintegration without undermining their cadres’ sentiments and militancy, and understanding the essence of strengthening national security agencies.
While preparing a rehabilitation and reintegration plan for former combatants, the government should immediately mobilize the Democratization Committee of the NA formed by the cabinet. The government should also take assistance of the High-Level Political Mechanism to increase confidence among political actors about the future of ex-combatants, and reduce existing mistrust and tension that has been disrupting proper enforcement of the CPA and nation-building process.
The PM’s proactive role must be appreciated in this regard, but public discussions are essential to establish accountable and transparent methods and ensure ownership of stakeholders during decision-making process. Deals regarding ex-combatants done in isolation cannot be sustainable. Hence, the focus should be on preparing criteria and minimum standards with the provision of independent monitoring, and reasonable timeline that are effective and enforceable through inclusive and public participatory approach.
A deadline without timeline and process would be unrealistic, insensitive and inappropriate.
peace_sb@yahoo.com
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