The alliance that staged, whether by popular participation or by coercion or by both, the mass uprising of 2006, which led to the downfall of monarchy and subsequent election of the CA, was a marriage of convenience between enemies of the enemy. They had nothing in common except their enmity toward King Gyanendra, who foolishly took power into his hands and antagonized all forces including India, the powerful southern neighbor in the realpolitik of this country.
It was clear that any ‘gentlemen’s understanding’ reached between the antagonists would hardly be binding once monarchy would be ousted; yet they demonstrated enough optimism at the beginning. In the absence of reliable arrangements to monitor and enforce the understandings, including the one to conclude the peace process by integrating some of the rebel combatants into the national armed forces and rehabilitating the rest into the society, and to promulgate the constitution, they are now in virtual limbo. Further, due to their vagueness and ambiguity, most of the deals made have now fallen prey to bargains based on self-serving interpretations.
Signatories in the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), especially NC and the CPN-UML among them, and the Maoists, who signed various peace pacts including the Indian brokered 12-point Delhi accord at the onset of peace process, grossly miscalculated the future political scenario of the nation and their relative
position/strength—each was confident that it will emerge as the decisive force and victor in the political center stage once monarchy was gone. Each of them, thus, assumed that they would be able to formulate the constitution and steer the peace process on their own.
The protagonist of the alliance Girija Prasad Koirala (GPK) – the authoritarian president of NC – wanted to reassert his authority both in national and inner party politics, which he was fast losing since some years. He therefore chose the short-cut and formed an alliance with the Maoists notwithstanding the fact that the Maoists’ explicit goal was to establish a one-party communist rule and who had for 9 out of 10 years of their insurgency declared ‘bourgeois parliamentary democracy’ and NC as their principle enemy.
Before bringing them into mainstream politics, he did very poor homework. Adequate details and specifics and proper safeguards were completely missing in whatever pact he reached with them. On the other hand, the Maoists, who were desperate to safe-land their bloody war as they were losing the battle, were only too happy to use GPK. The honeymoon that lasted for some two years despite occasional hiccups ended when the Maoists attempted to dismiss Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal.
Against this backdrop, it was only natural that a CA having a fractured composition of hostile forces would not be able to write a constitution that requires at least two-third majority to do the job; even the term extended for one year at first and then another three months after the stipulated time-frame of two years could do little to meet the purpose. However, despite the setbacks, the latest extension is justified. It is because there is no viable alternative to the extension. The term of the CA has to be extended, preferably until its mission is not over. But, this doesn’t mean that the CA should be licensed to extend its own tenure indefinitely without doing what it is supposed to do. Although some of the logic of the anti-extension lobby are sound, the beleaguered nation needs solution, not logic, however convincing they might appear.
All alternatives to the CA are either too risky or too unknown to try. Alternatives like a round table conference will be much worse both in terms of functionality and legitimacy than the existing CA. Similarly, reinstating of the 1991 constitution will hardly be acceptable to major stakeholders and political forces. The idea to entrust the task of constitution drafting to a small committee comprising senior leaders and/or experts to be ratified later by an elected parliament is not a viable and an acceptable alternative either.
That hundreds of thousands of new voters who were not eligible to vote last time have now become eligible (implying that fresh CA elections be held to accommodate their wish as the present CA no longer represents people’s will) is not sufficient reason to go for another CA polls. And didn’t the same people who argued like that demand and support, back in the early 2000s, the reinstatement of the Lower House of parliament dissolved four years before?
Skepticism that the CA may not complete the task entrusted within the extended few months when it could not do the same for 39 months is valid. Nevertheless, if the experience of the past few years is anything to go by, more time and more engagements in mainstream politics and constitutional/parliamentary proceedings will help transform the Maoists, however slowly and reluctantly. As the most difficult partners and principle stakeholders of peace process, there is every possibility that they (at least some of them) may resort to rebellion if this option is closed to them. This is one of the rationales not to dissolve the CA.
Compared to the last time – May 28 – this time around there was not much uproar against the extension both outside the CA building and elsewhere. Some say this was because people have become apathetic, some opine that both genuine demonstrators and the publicity hungry or INGO-funded rallyists were exhausted this time. Some even believed that Baburam Bhattarai’s election to the premiership just the day before overshadowed the whole extension debate. All those theories are true in their own way; however, I believe in one more theory and that is- people have become wiser and politically matured; they know that an extension is a less risky option, if not better.
jeevan1952@hotmail.com
No-one to guide