It is true that ‘others’ constitute only about 29 percent of national population. Their influence over society, politics and culture of the country, however, is far in excess of their numbers. For centuries, the top echelon of the caste hierarchy have held the power of definition and decided which groups to include or exclude from the mainstream identity.
In the context of South Asia, M. N. Srinivas introduced the term Sanskritization to describe the assimilation of indigenous cultures into Brahminical Hinduism. Such a process has become pervasive in Nepal ever since the promulgation of Muluki Ain in 1854 that institutionalised discrimination based upon caste and community. Gorkhali language—named Nepali in early 1950s—has been the state language since the ‘founding’ of the kingdom. Exceptions apart, those at the top of Hindu hierarchy have made, interpreted and enforced laws; exploited economic resources; controlled the state machinery; and decided the foreign policy of the country for the benefit of the ruling clique. Despite the full-spectrum dominance over the country, the ‘others’ believes that it still needs state patronage.
At this point, it is necessary to appreciate that Bahun and Chhetri castes in Nepali society are intertwined. There indeed are some ‘true blue’ Kshetriyas of Hindu Varna system in Nepal too. But the Chhetri community in Nepal is an amorphous group. When Bahun men marry non-Bahun women, their offspring acquire Chhetri status. Some families of Janjatis were probably granted Chhetri caste due to their bravery in the battlefield or loyalty to rulers. A few may have been elevated after they made considerable donations to temples. Examples from elsewhere in South Asia show that Sanskritization inspired nobility of all castes claim Kshetriya origin because they could never become Brahmans.
The Chhetri cohort in ‘others’ category is large precisely because one has to be born ‘pure’ to be a Bahun while the warrior status could be granted, achieved, acquired or claimed through various social, cultural and political means. It is possible that a large number of Chhetris resent being lumped with Bahuns. However, long and close association has blurred all distinctions and shared behavior makes the top rungs of caste hierarchy appear homogeneous. Among the grumblers over the Inclusion Bill however, Bahuns are in a majority.
Passive aggression
In order to protect their privileges, multiple reasons are being offered to justify the status quo. Bureaucrats are worried that positive discrimination would have a deleterious effect upon the quality of service. Incredibly, some senior government functionaries actually believe that they have risen through the ranks due to meritocracy rather than cultural privileges. Few admit that the Public Service Commission has long been known as the Bahun Service Commission among the excluded. If the worth of officialdom is to be judged by security ensured for the weaker sections of society or services delivered to the public, the so-called meritocracy in the country hardly deserves the distinction it claims in the name of quality.
Marxists hold that class is a bigger issue than caste; and Bahuns form a large part of the poor in the country. Once again, this argument is not without some merit. Bahuns in business is a new phenomenon. Few priests ploughed fields even after the taboo attached to the task was removed due to pioneering efforts of some community leaders when conscription for wars abroad reduced availability of wage labor in the countryside.
Caste disqualified priests and preceptors from mercenary services. They found it difficult to break into commercial networks of trading communities. They had limited means of livelihood other than patronage of the landed gentry and the munificence of temple trusts. Consequently, Bahuns have moved in search of economic opportunities even as Janjatis remained tied to the land of their ancestors. The itinerant character of the community rarely helped them prosper. Rolling stoners gathered little moss. Instead, they gained gloss and began to dominate governance.
It is necessary to understand the angst of ‘others’ in order to appreciate its ramifications. It seems that the ‘others’ have largely accepted that the kingdom is gone for good and Nepal has no place for monarchy any more. However, the dominant community is unwilling to loosen its grip over polity and society. Having sacrificed monarchy, the cultural elite thinks that it has the right to demand that the system that supported the old order be left intact.
Behind the veil of progressivism there is passive aggression that seeks to enlarge the turf of traditional privileges in administrative services and academia. The cloak of communism fails to hide that the proletarian vanguard is communalist to the core. The risk for the rest of population have multiplied as the ‘others’ have begun to make headway in commercial activities through their highly lucrative investments in education, health, transport, construction, banking, retail trade and cartels of other service businesses.
The crony capitalism that flourished in the wake of liberalization, globalization and privatization drive benefited a particular community over others as returns from nefarious deals were ploughed back into business in the names of close chums and distant cousins of powerful officials and influential politicos. Corruption is always what others do: Priests and preceptors ‘purify’ all such deals with a mere signature.
Injured innocence
The ‘others’ correctly assert that they have always been at the forefront of every democratic struggle in the country. The contradiction of the claim is impossible to ignore—they have continuously occupied not just the ruling dispensation but the oppositional space as well. The result is for all to see. The more things change in Kathmandu, the more they remain the same: Out goes the Jajman patron; in comes the Purohit priest and vice-versa, ad infinitum. Had it not been for the Madhesh Uprising, it is unlikely that the first president of the republic would have been from a community long considered the ‘other’ of the self-defined Nepali ‘self’. The impact was indirect, but lessons of Madhesh Uprising were probably instrumental in elevation of a Janjati officer to the leadership position of a force for the first time in its history even though they had served with distinction since its inception.
Animosity for Janjatis, Madheshis and Dalits among members of the ‘others’ community run deep. It probably originates in a characteristic that Max Scheler (1874–1928), drawing upon works of Friedrich Nietzsche, identified as Ressentiment: A complex emotion of “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite”.
The mask of meritocracy has been manufactured to defend a caste aristocracy in civil administration. The myth of martial race was manufactured by military strategists of the East India Company to punish rebellious communities of Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 and reward those who helped colonialists suppress the mass uprising that followed in its wake in the Ganga plains. It is being used to discredit victims of internal colonization in the country. However, political posturing takes the cake for its sheer audacity. Why do leaders of the ‘others’ claim a separate identity when it is being maintained that their monopoly over the definition of ‘mainstream’ be left intact? The answer to that question is a sheering sense of ressentiment: A feeling of deep anxiety or dread, not of losing what it already has but of not gaining what the community thinks it rightfully deserves due to its inherent superiority.
Having made peace with republicanism, the dominant minority of 29 percent will use its advantages to divide and rule. Control over the right to interpret and implement citizenship laws would be used to discredit promising Madheshis. Specter of conversion would be raised to counter secularism. Fears of fragmentation have come in handy to fight the idea of substantive federalism. Free-market fundamentalism has no place for social justice but it permits appropriation of commons under the guise of what the imperialists once called the doctrine of imminent domain. Proponents of positive discrimination may not realize it, but the proposed Inclusion Bill has more hurdles ahead of it than they can dare to imagine.
Socio-cultural revolutions cannot be legislated. To slightly tweak a Marxist formulation, ressentiment is a ‘forged consciousness’ and it can only be countered through politics of plurality. Little wonder, Bahun politicos detest parliamentary democracy so much: The system is inherently unpredictable and can throw unlikely winners due to compulsions of coalition politics. Now, who in the CPN-UML—the archetypal party of Pahadi priestly caste—can ever imagine being under a dispensation where a Madheshi could become its chairperson, a Dalit would be the head of state, and God forbid, a Christian would aspire to be the premier someday?
Contestation over forms of government is merely a red herring. Opposition to Inclusion Bill highlights the fact that issues at stake are ingredients of plural politics—secularism, federalism and social justice.
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