Barring the exceptions, Nepali prime ministers (PMs), soon after assuming office, make their first official visit to India. The PMs of successive governments formed after the 1990 Popular Movement have consistently followed this practice, as if it were an unwritten convention of Nepal’s foreign policy. Despite Nepal’s deep-rooted ties with India anchored in language, religion, geography and trade, this tradition is increasingly prompting a fundamental question: how long should this continue?
According to sources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal, new PM Balendra Shah, has received an invitation from India for an official visit, although the dates are yet to be decided. Leading a near two-thirds majority government and anticipated to serve a full five-year term in a country that has witnessed 30 governments in 36 years after 1990, he faces unusually high public expectations. In such a context, there is little room to repeat the missteps of his predecessors. His recent meeting with 17 ambassadors has already raised questions about diplomatic protocol, suggesting that he now walks a diplomatic tightrope.
Although the new government led by the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) has brought in a cohort of younger and relatively well-educated ministers, foreign policy remains an especially sensitive discipline - more so in the context of Nepal, where geopolitical complexities call for experience and ingenuity. The current leadership’s limited exposure to international relations (IR) raises legitimate concerns about preparedness. The PM’s decision to directly convene a meeting with ambassadors, coupled with apparent gaps in its preparation, has sparked debate about adherence to diplomatic decorum.
Nepalis have pinned high hopes on the RSP government, and public expectations are correspondingly high. At the same time, the RSP faces a perception in some quarters being relatively closer to India; it renders any diplomatic engagement particularly sensitive. Given the long-standing practice of signing agreements during high-level visits, even minor misstep in bilateral negotiations could cost politically at home. Yet, PM Shah may be given the benefit of the doubt, as he joined the RSP shortly before the parliamentary election of March 2026, and is a man of few words.
Ties of tradition
Despite Nepal’s adherence to a policy of maintaining equidistance between its two immediate neighbours – India and China – the relationship with India remains deeper and more multifaceted, shaped by shared language, culture, religion, an open border and extensive trade and transit linkages. Yet such proximity does not imply a hierarchical relationship. Nepal, though smaller in size, is a sovereign country entitled to conduct its foreign policy on the basis of equality and mutual respect. In that light, a fundamental question arises: why should every new Nepali PM begin their official visit with India?
During his premiership, Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited China in 2008 before travelling to India. This was widely interpreted as a rare and politically sensitive departure from the ‘India First’ convention, signalling a deliberate shift in diplomatic posture. A similar, though more constrained, situation emerged during the third tenure of KP Sharma Oli as a PM. Despite repeated efforts to secure an early visit to India, an invitation from New Delhi was slow to materialize, reportedly reflecting unease following Kathmandu’s decision to publish a revised political map of Nepal incorporating Lipulek and Limpiyadhura. Meanwhile, Oli visited China in August 2025 to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit where he also held bilateral meetings with Chinese and other leaders.
This sequence of events was interpreted by many observers as a departure from established diplomatic practice, with potential implications for Nepal-India relations. In a strange turn of events, in both instances, the governments led by Dahal and Oli proved short-lived, reinforcing the perception – whether coincidental or not – that deviations from the conventional diplomatic sequence carry political sensitivity in Nepal’s foreign policy landscape. These events have raised an uncomfortable question: is Nepal’s foreign policy truly sovereign, or still constrained by unwritten expectations?
There is little evidence to suggest that any newly appointed prime minister of India has reciprocated by making Nepal their first foreign visit. After a hiatus of 17 years following IK Gujral’s visit in 1997, Narendra Modi visited Nepal in 2014 at the invitation of then PM Sushil Koirala—but notably, it was not his first visit abroad; his first foreign trip had been to Bhutan. Even leaders such as Gujral, who championed a ‘neighbourhood-first approach’, did not make Nepal their initial destination. This underscores the absence of any reciprocal diplomatic convention.
Nepal, for its part, has consistently upheld mutual respect and sovereign equality as the guiding principles of its foreign policy, often portraying itself as one of the oldest sovereign states in Asia. Yet, the pattern of high-level visits suggests an asymmetry that invites reflection, particularly when compared with India’s prioritisation of Bhutan, a much smaller neighbour with a different historical and strategic relationship.
On the one hand, PM Shah’s visit comes at a time when the government led by the RSP has made visible strides in governance reform. The arrest of senior political figures on corruption charges has generated public optimism about a renewed commitment to accountability. At the same time, pledges to deliver essential services—such as passports, driving licences, national identity cards, and citizenship certificates—at citizens’ doorsteps have further enhanced public confidence.
On the other hand, preparations to facilitate bilateral trade between India and China through the disputed Lipulek Pass have emerged as a major point of contention. Claimed by Nepal but contested by India, the issue has strained an otherwise close relationship. In this context, New Delhi’s reluctance to act on the report of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) has further deepened concerns in Kathmandu.
Against this backdrop, opposition leaders have begun pressing the government to raise both the border issue and the EPG report during the upcoming visit. Yet, this places PM Shah in a delicate position: remaining silent may invite criticism at home for compromising national interest, while raising the issues forcefully risks unsettling bilateral ties. Either course carries political costs, leaving Nepal’s leadership to navigate diplomacy like a tightrope walker suspended between competing powers, where even a minor misstep can prove costly.
Given this Catch-22 situation, it may be in the best interest of both the nation and PM Shah to proceed with caution. Having earlier indicated that he would refrain from foreign visits for a period in order to focus on improving governance and service delivery, he has a credible basis to defer his visit to India. This window could instead be utilised to undertake serious preparatory work on sensitive issues, including the disputed territories of Lipulek and Limpiyadhura, and broader trade concerns.
Through appropriate diplomatic channels, the government can convey to New Delhi that, while committed to strengthening bilateral ties, the PM is presently prioritising domestic consolidation in line with his stated commitments. Accelerating reform efforts at home would not only reduce political vulnerability but also enhance the government’s credibility and strengthen its negotiating position abroad.
Ultimately, rethinking the ‘India First’ tradition is about redefining them on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respect, and strategic clarity. For Nepal, the challenge is not choosing between India and China, but asserting the confidence to engage both on its own terms. Long guided by convention and compulsion, Nepal’s foreign policy now stands at a critical juncture. Breaking away from reflexive practices and grounding diplomacy in national interest, institutional strength, and domestic credibility is an imperative. Diplomatic convention should not become a strategic compulsion.
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