"The gist of the current debate is that they (party hardliners led by Senior Vice-chairman Mohan Baidya) are looking for ways to derail the peace process, while we are struggling to take it to a logical end,” told UCPN(Maoist) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, aka ‘Prachanda’ (the fierce), to a group of media persons at his residence. As reported by this daily on March 23, he also blamed the Baidya faction, among other things, of trying to split the party. Never before has Dahal criticized the Baidya faction so directly; he has either played down their sharp attacks or placated them. But with the days to complete the peace process, especially the army integration, now being numbered, he seems to have decided to take the stalled peace process to its logical end. And as the Baidya faction is against the peace process, both in principle and its present form, Dahal’s decision is likely to split the party. He, however, knows that he has little choice.
For two reasons Dahal has so far refrained from directly criticizing the Baidya faction. One, he wanted to avoid the split as far as possible. Two, he also wanted to play the ‘pro-peace, pro-constitution’ faction of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai and ‘pro-people’s revolt’ Baidya faction against each other so that he could forever remain party leader, the supreme commander of the ‘People’s Liberation Army’ and subsequently, head of the government, whenever possible. Everyone supported him in the belief that they could use his strength and position against the other. It was only when both sides realized that Dahal was fooling them to advance his own interests and ambitions that the two formed an alliance against the latter last year known as the ‘Dhobighat’ alliance. An unwilling Dahal was, therefore, forced to propose Bhattarai’s name for the premiership. Despite its momentary and tactical alliance with Bhattarai’s small group, Baidya faction was never happy either with Dahal’s support or India’s backing of the Bhattarai-led coalition government. Therefore, the faction has tried to topple the government from the very onset.Their activities defied all logic and norms of party discipline and they persistently demanded the premier’s resignation both from the streets and the floor of the House.
In my previous write-ups, I have stated that a split in the UCPN (M) is just a matter of ‘when’ and not ‘whether’ and now it seems that the ‘when’ has arrived. However, in communist parties, ‘whens’ happen with certain events, for example, the Mahakali treaty in case of the CPN-UML split. In case of the Maoists, either the conclusion of the peace process or promulgation of the constitution will be the likely pretexts for the break-up. So far, Baidya’s faction seems to have decided, for whatever reasons, not to capitalize on the peace building. That leaves the promulgation of the constitution, which certainly won’t be a ‘people’s constitution’ the way they had been demanding and, therefore, the time point for party split.
ROOT OF THE PROBLEM
Despite Dahal’s dubious role, both he and Bhattarai are revolutionary-turned-pragmatists while Baidya is an unchanging communist revolutionary. He and his hard-line followers believe in the ‘purest’ form of communism, with no deviations at all from the teachings of Lenin and Mao. They also presume that communists can achieve their goal only through a violent struggle, and not by peaceful means. Hence, they are against peace-building and any form of ‘bourgeoisie constitution.’ However divorced from reality, their views and interpretations had endowed a large number of party hardliners with conviction and optimism. And why not, after all Baidya’s brand of communism has thrived in this country in the past, which was not without reasons. To their luck, except political oppression, everything else that may breed revolution or extremism such as poverty, unemployment, lack of education, bad governance, corruption, political instability, economic inequality and social exclusion continued to exist even after the restoration of democracy in 1990.
With a tremendous gap and disconnect in understanding, approach and ideology, rival factions within the UCPN (Maoist) led by Prachanda and Mohan Baidya can hardly remain together for long.
While other Third World countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Peru, succeeded in crushing similar insurgence through a combination of armed action, rapid economic development and political reforms, it was a different story in Nepal. Army mobilization was late, short-lived and was never backed by political consensus. Everything from political instability and dirty power games of politicians to the rugged mountainous terrains shielded with forests and scattered settlements that posed as deterrent for army actions proved to be blessings for the rebels. The indifference of the Nepali Congress (NC), which ruled during most of the insurgency period, towards socioeconomic change combined with its intra-party fights, corruption, lackluster performances and weak organizational capabilities, rendered it too weak to politically counter the rebellion. Police operations lacking political prudence and adequate intelligence that were carried in the rebel strongholds during the initial phase of the rebellion proved counter-productive. The secret patronage the Maoists enjoyed from the Indian establishment and the then King Birendra helped them grow stronger. And finally, democratization of CPN-UML—the communist mainstream of the country—provided Maoists with large numbers of radical cadres who, dissatisfied with the party’s ‘ideological deviation’, were looking for their ‘true’ home to join.
ALTERED GROUND-REALITY
The underground Maoists were also a major force behind making the uprising of 2006 a success. With their superiority in terms of might, money, muscle and militancy over their rivals (especially with the successful use of their private army in the guise of Young Communist League in rigging the elections), they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly polls of 2008. The rest, as they say, is history. What, however, Baidya and his ultra-radical colleagues—especially the likes of Ram BahadurThapa, CP Gajurel and Netra Bikram Chand—do not comprehend is that most of those favorable factors do not exist now. They are no longer the unknown guerilla leaders of an underground and secretive organization to safely and successfully oversee a ‘people’s war’; neither Rukum/Rolpa nor Delhi/Lucknow will offer them safe havens anymore.
The diminishing number and damp enthusiasm of people during their "People´s War Day” celebrations on 13th February should have served as an eye opener for them. Their new-found weaknesses such as intra-party fights, greed, changed lifestyles, misgovernance and corruption have proved to be extremely costly for them. These adversities are not lost on Dahal and Bhattarai and both are aware there is zero domestic and external support for any sort of ‘people’s revolt,’ let alone a new ‘people’s war.’ The leaders now in their mid or late fifties who aspire to rule the country for the rest of their lives and who have been used to the comforts of power are naturally not in favor of such misadventures, something Baidya and his colleagues do not comprehend. With such a gap in understanding, approach, ideology and lifestyle, they can hardly remain together for long.
In hindsight, Baidya was never happy with any of the peace deals. Mysteriously, he and his hard-line fellow comrade CP Gajurel were in Indian jails on superficial offences when the New Delhi brokered 12-points peace accord was signed between Maoists and mainstream parties in 2006. During the initial stages of the peace-building process, Baidya could not garner much support for his views. However, in each successive plenum of the party from Balaju to Kharipati and Palungtar, Dahal succeeded in furthering his cause largely because he played ‘the Baidya card’ to bargain for more concessions from his intra and inner party rivals—namely Bhattarai faction, NC, CPN-UML and even the Indian establishment. Even after the March 22 press conference, Dahal is still, for whatever reason, trying to hold on to the Baidya faction. Now, however, he cannot and should not, spoil or stall the peace process. He must complete the job, with or without the Baidya faction.
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