As per the country´s security structure, the National Investigation Department (NID) is now supposed to produce the bulk of intelligence for tackling such incidents. But there has not been a single tip-off or analysis emanating from NID. The detachment of NID from such crucial security issues has been taken for granted. [break]
Meanwhile, Nepal Police has never looked upon intelligence as a core need because not a single rupee has officially been spent for it. “It´s as if the state has never thought that the police should have a budget for intelligence,” said officials.
“As in lots of cases in the past, we are blank on all these shooting incidents because they were well-planned and even had international linkages. The same situation can prevail in future also given that everything remains the same,” said an investigative official.
In the Central Jail shooting, police made some basic finds --yet to be verified -- because the Indian gunman was arrested at the scene and was compelled to give his statement. The other three shootings--at Teku, Ganabahal, and (of the Pakistani embassy official at) Maharajgunj --yielded no clue for the authorities to follow.
“We are not going to work hard on the Maharajgunj shooting,” said an official. “Why should we our waste time? We do not expect anything dramatic such as the culprits surrendering or uncovering of plot and motive.”
Police investigations have been unable to resolve even locally-originated organized crime, let alone internationally-planned crimes like the Jamim murder, the Ansari shooting and possibly the attempt on the Pakistani official´s life. “Both organized crime and internationally-originated crime have remained beyond the reach of Nepal´s security agencies,” said officials with substantial experience in investigations and intelligence.
“Information mechanisms need urgent reform for effective results and for the broader objective of maintaining law and order,” said Nepal Police spokesman DIG Navaraj Dhakal, while chief of Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) DIG Rajendra Singh Bhandari opined, “It´s already too late to improve things on the intelligence front.”
Other police officials contacted by Republica did not wish to comment on record.
Intelligence on their own
In the absence of NID inputs for general security, Nepal Police has to depend on its own information network which is not really functioning institutionally. Different wings are supposed to focus on intelligence, such as the newly established CIB, the Anti-Terrorist Cell (ATC) and Metropolitan Police Crime Division (MPCD). Besides these wings, every vital unit is supposed to assign a certain number of plainclothes cops to its respective area.
The crux of the problem is tht almost none of the mechanisms is funded and they have to rely on their own resources for information. The managing of resources for intelligence, officials said, has also shown the accepted trend of corruption. “The government cannot always check that money because it is not something that it hands out,” said highly placed officials.
ATC is a somewhat different wing. It seems to have less to do with general security than with transborder issues and is even facilitated by foreign agencies. CIB is yet to have its regulations endorsed by the government and has been working with a staff of just 172, and without any extra budget. MPCD gets not a single buck in the name of intelligence work. Besides salaries, it gets only around Rs 500,000 annually as administrative expenses despite its having an investigation team of 142.
All the general policing units, such as the Metropolitan Police Range Kathmandu, face an uphill task over intelligence. It has an intelligence wing with hardly a dozen personnel who officially get nothing but their salaries. Similarly, all six circle offices have deputized a maximum of five cops for intelligence operations including plainclothes operations in their highly populated coverage areas. Commissions from the seizure of illegal vehicles sometimes come as a boon for them.
“How can five cops cover around seven square kilometers that fall within our jurisdiction?” said the chief of one circle office. “We cannot even imagine maintaining informants without funding from outside, which is not always possible.”
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