Despite having failed to promulgate a constitution through the Constituent Assembly, and subsequent blame game and dirty power plays among political parties, Nepal has set yet another milestone by successfully concluding the integration and rehabilitation process. Integration and rehabilitation of rebel combatants is a really messy, contentious process for any post-conflict country.
It is also time-consuming and filled with risks. But not only did Nepal conclude the integration and rehabilitation process, it also established a unique Nepali model. Every conflict and peace process is unique in the political, social, economic and military context of different countries. But Nepal’s indigenous peace process still stands out in many aspects and it cannot be compared with the peace process in any other post-conflict country. [break]

Republica
First, Nepal’s peace process is a domestic actors-led process. It was the political parties that initiated, led and concluded the entire process. There have been third party involvements in the peace process in most post-conflict countries. Nepal government did seek solidarity and support on technical aspects as per the requirements (for instance, during demobilizing combatants in the cantonments, during registration and verification of arms and combatants, and during monitoring of the arms of containers and cantonments) from the international community.
But it was the political parties that envisaged the contents of the peace process and concluded the process according to past agreements. It is worth noting that even in a highly polarized society and fractured polity, the cross-party political mechanism without any expertise in peace process not only took all the decisions based on consensus, but also completed the peace process by establishing a Nepali model by stepping on basic international norms. Therefore, it is a big success of the government and political parties to be able to complete the process without the involvement of third parties.
Second, Nepal’s armed conflict came to an end through peaceful dialogue. The then rebel party—the CPN (Maoist) which had waged an armed struggle to establish ‘people’s democracy’ —renounced violence and embraced the fundamental tenets of peaceful democratic process. The Maoists joined political mainstream and transformed itself into a civilian party by dissolving its army and handing over arms to government. Therefore, it has been shown that a violent conflict can be resolved through peaceful dialogue following substantial political, social and economic changes.
Third, the then Seven Party Alliance and the rebel party decided to fight jointly against the king’s despotic regime and establish democracy by signing the Twelve-Point Agreement in 2005. Ultimately, in 2006, they succeeded in establishing Nepal as a democratic republic by dethroning the king. It proved that an armed party which waged a violent struggle and un-armed civilian parties which believe in peace and democracy could successfully fight together for peace and democracy.
Fourth, political parties followed the principle of ‘consensus through dialogue,’ a very positive and unique aspect of Nepal’s peace process. Despite divergence of views, disagreement and objection on various contentious issues and processes, major political parties did not close the door of dialogue. The Twelve-Point Agreement, the Interim Constitution, the CPA, the AMMAA and the Seven-Point Agreement are the palpable outcomes of such dialogue. Political parties were highly criticized for their never-ending series of dialogue, but to their credit, they often reached agreements on major contentious issues.
Fifth, Nepal learnt lessons from other countries’ practices on integration and rehabilitation but did not import and replicate their models. Instead, it developed a ‘Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation’ on the basis of the Interim Constitution, the CPA, the AMMAA and subsequent political agreements among the political parties. Nepal did not follow the technical process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) applied by many post-conflict countries.
Nepal did not even use the term DDR, even though the ex-combatants were demobilized and disarmed in 2006. Instead it used the term ‘management of arms and armies’. Nepal also did not use the term Security Sector Reform (SSR), although it followed the principles of SSR during the peace process. In fact, all these technical issues were contextualized in the Nepali context.
Sixth, prevalent international practice has two options for ex-combatants’ integration into security agencies or reintegration into society; Nepal introduced a new concept of voluntary retirement as a part of reintegration into the society. Out of the 19,602 combatants, 15,624 chose voluntary retirement. Likewise, 1,422 combatants integrated into the Nepal Army (NA). Only six combatants chose rehabilitation. In fact, Nepal’s integration and rehabilitation process has been successful because of generous cash package ranging from Rs 0.5 to Rs 0.8 million. It is a truly Nepali concept and could be applicable to other conflict-ridden countries.
Most of the post-conflict countries asked for monetary assistance with the international community. But Nepal did not follow that precedence, and instead mobilized taxpayers’ money for voluntary retirement. Nepal might be the first post-conflict developing country to complete the integration and rehabilitation process through the mobilization of its internal resources.
Seventh, the Nepal Army played a constructive and instrumental role in integrating its former enemy against whom it had fought a bloody war. Even when political parties had contradictory opinions and adamant stands that widened their differences, the army gave a much-needed impetus by proposing integration of ex-combatants under it by establishing a new National Security and Development Directorate. In fact, the NA facilitated the integration process by being more flexible and liberal than opposition parties.
Had the army not been positive, the integration would have been more difficult and complex. Even the decisions of the Supreme Court and the government would not have been implemented, if the army had opposed the decisions. Therefore, the NA played an instrumental role and established an exceptional precedent in integration processes.
Though the integration and rehabilitation process has been completed, which is positive, the post-integration context is still challenging with respect to sustainable peace. It took long time (more than six years) to complete the process, at the cost of more than Rs 20.73 billion, a big burden on Nepali economy. The government and political parties focused heavily on integration of ex-combatants.
But they did not pay much-needed attention to ensuring justice to conflict victims and bringing perpetrators to book by putting an end to pervasive impunity. In seven-long years, they did not even constitute the much-debated Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Commission on Forced Disappearance which were integral parts of the constitution and the CPA.
Had Nepal managed to promulgate a new constitution through the CA, it would have been a truly exemplary model of comprehensive peace process. Nonetheless, the very Nepali model of integration and rehabilitation has sent a distinctly positive, albeit partial, message to conflict-ridden countries around the globe.
The author is
a security analyst
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