The UML-Maoist coalition has before it both the lure of carrot and the threat of stick for getting things done.
So long as the Maoists were in the opposition Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal felt cornered in national politics and was worried that his party might never get back into power. He used to tell close aides that there would neither be a constitution nor another general election as long as the NC-UML coalition led by Madhav Kumar Nepal was in power and as long as it thought that the Maoists had a chance of winning the elections.
With the Maoist-UML coalition now at the helm Dahal can feel assured that if the parties agree to a constitution, the country will be on track for another election. Should that happen, both Dahal and Khanal will get the credit, more than anyone else, for steering the country through the difficult transition and they will thus consolidate their positions in their respective parties and in national politics. That´s the carrot.
And the stick is: The Maoist-UML coalition will have to work and make significant progress on the peace process and constitution-making before May 28, the day the current term of the CA expires, to prove its relevance. If this coalition is seen as an obstacle or even as ineffectual in delivering peace and constitution, it will lose its legitimacy and a new political alliance will emerge. If not incentive, it is sometimes threat that drives political parties into action.
Though Khanal-Dahal lost a crucial one month trying to give the cabinet full shape— and they continue to strain on that front— they have lately made some progress on peace and constitution.
Dahal and Khanal have agreed to a 50-day roadmap to complete the integration/rehabilitation of Maoist combatants. And Dahal is already showing some flexibility in constitution-making— the latest agreement on the judiciary, including the formation of a constitutional court led by the Chief Justice, is a case in point.
The next step -- and challenge -- for Dahal and Khanal is to bring into the process other players, mainly the disgruntled factions within their own parties and the NC and Madhesi parties.
The 50-day roadmap on PLA integration/rehabilitation (details of which are yet to be made public) will have to be taken up, endorsed and implemented by the Special Committee in which the NC and Madhesi parties are crucial players. As the working procedure of the Special Committee requires unanimous decisions of all its members the NC and Madhesi parties will have to be taken into confidence for any decisions regarding the peace process.
But there is good news on the peace process: When the NC, Maoists and UML negotiators had their last negotiations on the process at Radisson Hotel just before the formation of this government they had almost reached an agreement. What stalled the final deal was the issue of who should lead the government first. Both the NC and Maoists insisted that they deserved the first chance. Now, if either of the parties relents on its earlier position, an agreement on the peace process won’t be difficult.
One of the challenges, however, is likely to come from within the Maoist party. Will the Baidya faction see compromises, which are essential if there is to be a deal, as submission over the Maoist cause? A final deal on the PLA will have to ascertain the number of Maoist combatants to be integrated into the security forces and the PLA will have to be dismissed after integration and rehabilitation are done with but before there is agreement on the draft of the constitution. Will Dahal be able to persuade the Baidya faction, which still sees revolt as an option, to agree to that?
Mohan Baidya himself doesn’t seem to have the courage or the charisma to lead a revolt or to say no to Dahal, but watch out for what role Netra Bikram Chand plays. Dahal failed to persuade Chand to join the government despite repeated attempts. Chand has told people close to him that there was no point joining a government that would not be able to draft a ‘people’s constitution’. Chand, a young, ambitious and influential leader who has so far kept himself free from greed for power and wealth, sees himself as Dahal’s alternative in the party. It’s for this reason as well that Dahal will be watchful of what Chand says and does.
If the Baidya faction wants to sabotage the efforts of Dahal and Khanal, it can raise the sensitive issue of the home ministry. Due to internal power dynamics in the UML Prime Minister Khanal cannot hand over the home ministry to the Maoists unless there is significant progress in the peace process, and Dahal understands that perfectly. But the Baidya faction can play spoilsport.
And there are complications related to constitution-making. The parties seem to be in a mood to form a state restructuring commission and defer the sensitive issue concerning federalizing the country, at least for now. So there is a bit of relief for the parties.
But they have to reach agreement on the hotly-contested issues of form of governance and electoral system. The main dispute is whether to keep the parliamentary system or replace it with a directly-elected presidential/prime ministerial system. Both these systems have their pros and cons in the Nepali context.
A directly-elected executive head will be a strong leader and will not have to appease various parties and individuals, especially in case of a hung parliament/senate. On the other hand, the strong leader can become a problem given the dictatorial tendencies of our leaders. Just think what course Nepali politics would have taken if the late Girija Prasad Koirala and Pushpa Kamal Dahal had been directly-elected executive heads in the mid-1990s and 2009 respectively when they were constrained only by the numbers game in parliament. So the trade-off is between stability and checks and balance.
This issue is unlikely to be settled strictly on the merits of the argument; instead, it will require the carrot of a power-sharing deal, especially for the NC and Madhesi parties.
Why would the NC and Madhesi parties cooperate and reach an agreement on the constitution if there is no power-sharing deal on the table. They have taken their cue from the Maoist party’s refusal to cooperate on the peace process and constitution-making as long as they were in the opposition.
Moreover, the Maoists also don’t wish to be the UML’s junior partner in government until another election. But given the power dynamics in the UML, the Maoists will not be able to replace the government leadership with their own.
Therefore, expect a new power-sharing deal around May 28 that includes all the parties. Without such a deal the ruling coalition alone cannot announce a constitution nor can it extend the CA deadline. The opposition parties— NC and Madhesi parties—also don’t have the appetite for an unending fight, nor do they want to be seen as obstacles to peace and constitution.
Conclusion: The peace process will be near-complete in the next two and half months and there will be an agreement among the major parties on constitutional issues, including power-sharing.
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