How golden is the handshake for Nepal's demobilized Maoists?

Durable peace is still elusive some five years since the end of Nepal’s civil war. One of the reasons for this is because the country’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration – or DDR - process has failed to lift off. And while there are a host of political and tactical reasons for the slow pace of DDR, its absence constitutes a thorny challenge for public authorities and civil society alike.

Nepal is not alone in undertaking DDR. In fact, more than 60 such initiatives have occurred around the world since the early 1990s. Most of these were launched in the wake of violent conflicts. Whether mandated by a peace agreement, a UN Security Council resolution, or unilaterally by a government, each DDR operation has faced pitfalls and challenges.

A lynchpin of DDR success appears to be the securing of meaningful livelihood for former combatants and their dependents. In fact, the promotion of post-war employment is a critical measure of a society’s capacity to recover and rebuild. When real opportunities for former fighters are achieved, a peace dividend typically follows. By contrast, where unemployment rates remain high, disgruntled ex-combatants may sometimes threaten individual, community and national security.

More optimistically, there are signs that Nepal’s peace process is picking up after a four year hiatus. Earlier this month roughly 100 Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reservists responsible for “protecting” their leaders were replaced with government personnel. The termination of the so-called dual security system was anticipated by a five-point deal signed by key parties on May 29th which also resulted in an extension of the Constituent Assembly’s tenure.

Yet the road ahead for ensuring sustainable employment for Nepal´s ex-combatants is steep. There are roughly 19,000 PLA recruits living in 28 cantonments spread around the country. They will be included in a “regrouping” process as agreed by Nepal’s political parties in order to hasten the peace process. A bipartisan Special Committee for Supervision, Integration and Rehabilitation of Maoist Army Combatants has endorsed the calendar to complete the regrouping process by August 27th.

Notwithstanding the compelling reasons to move forward quickly the obstacles ahead cannot be underestimated. Just 5,000 to 8,000 of these former combatants are likely to be “integrated” into the armed forces while most will be retired and reinserted into society. There are still acrimonious debates over rank harmonization and the overall mandate of the new mixed force. Leaders of the security and political establishments are keen to set relatively attractive rehabilitation and retirement packages for former combatants in the hopes to dissuade them from joining the security forces and to avoid fatal politicization.

The jury is still out on the costs and benefits of cash payments in DDR initiatives. One camp contends that such programs maximize flexibility in determining how individuals and households spend their money while another claims that cash is not conflict sensitive, can be misused by providers and recipients alike.

Much of current debate on DDR in Nepal is focused on the shape and size of these rehabilitation and voluntary retirement packages. There is some evidence that most former combatants tend to prefer long-term employment opportunities or lump cash payouts tied to their years of service. Former fighters believe that cash transfers will help them establish their own business, facilitate labour migration or join the political mainstream. Not surprisingly, former combatants would prefer a sizeable monetary transfer to the meagre allotments issued to late recruits and minors in 2010.

Around the world, DDR interventions typically flounder owing to disagreements over the size of rehabilitation packages. Indeed, the secretariat of Nepal’s Special Committee proposed a golden handshake of USD$6,340 for those opting for retirement. The secretariat contends that the package is equivalent to 15 years of income for a typical civil servant, including Nepali police and army personnel. In the meantime, the Maoist leadership has demanded NRs 1 million for each combatant. The lines are being drawn.

A critical question facing all parties concerns the funding for these rehabilitation packages. Nepal´s public coffers are drying up if not already dry. Obvious candidates for covering the costs of DDR are multilateral and bilateral donors. And Western donors have repeatedly informed government authorities and political parties that they simply cannot fund cash payment schemes. Though they are prepared to support rehabilitation activities, they are unwilling to underwrite cash payments. Such activities would not go down well with taxpayers in their home countries. In the words of one official: “Cash means cash, cash is not rehabilitation”.

Notwithstanding donor wariness, the Nepali stakeholders are determined to move ahead. Maoist leadership have publicly said that efforts by United Nations agencies to rehabilitate so-called late recruits and minors failed to meet the expectations of former combatants. They contend that training programs were simply not perceived to be appropriate and failed to generate employment on a meaningful scale. They contend that cash payments could even strengthen the peace process. This is because both Maoist party leaders and non-Maoist party authorities cash payments to integration – an unlikely alliance that both seek to build upon.

In the end, cash payments for former combatants will likely be drawn down from the country’s development budget, itself underwritten by aid agencies. The Nepali government will need to divert funds originally slated for wider social welfare activities to cover the costs of retirement packages. In the interest of preserving the peace process, it is unlikely that donors will protest this move. And while DDR may well move forward, there is every reason to believe that there will be resentment of such a massive transfer of funds. Such a move will not come without major political costs and the government should be prepared to manage expectations.

There are many political risks accompanying the Nepali government’s strategy. For one, the jury is still out on the costs and benefits of cash payments in DDR initiatives. One camp contends that such programs maximize flexibility in determining how individuals and households spend their money while another claims that cash is not conflict sensitive, can be misused by providers and recipients alike. More positively, there is some evidence that paying out cash in modest instalments over an extended period of time can be effective. Likewise, when cash is shared with families – particularly wives and spouses – there is a stronger likelihood that it will be devoted to productive purposes.

How the cash transfer process is managed will strongly influence the success or failure of Nepal’s DDR program. It is obvious that Nepalis are proud of their home grown peace process. It is this very confidence that may encourage them to rapidly go ahead with cash payments despite the reservations of donors. And yet the Nepali authorities would be wise to carefully plan their program. They will need to carefully manage the already spiralling expectations of former combatants, the tactical interests of political parties and the perceptions of civil society if they are to achieve the dividend that all citizens demand.

Mr Bogati is coordinator of the Nepal Armed Violence Assessment (NAVA). Mr Muggah is the Research Director of the Small Arms Survey. The views expressed are their own

subindra.bogati@smallarmssurvey.org