Of course, we could also debate when the political transition started. Did it start in 2006 after the protesting democratic parties prevailed over the autocratic monarch? Or did it start only in 2008 when the new Constituent Assembly formally dissolved the institution of monarchy? Whatever the case, last decade or so constitute easily the most turbulent period in the history of modern Nepal.
Many believe the writing was on the wall for Shah monarchy after the (still unresolved) palace massacre of 2001. If Gyanendra Shah was not involved in it, he also didn't do anything to endear himself to common Nepalis when he assumed full executive powers in 2004, dismissing the Deuba government as 'incompetent' and suspending civic liberties. In King Gyanendra's reckoning, the reason there was no headway in the prolonged fight against Maoists was because the democratic leaders that came to office after 1996, the year the Maoist insurgency started, didn't have the resolve to crush the rebels militarily. As commander-in-chief of Royal Nepal Army, Gyanendra believed he could do so.
Or if he couldn't crush them—an unlikely prospect, he must have thought, given the disproportionately large security forces (as compared to the Maoist militia) at his disposal—he would try to outfox the democratic parties by forming an alliance with the Maoists. This was why even as the security forces tried their best to eliminate the Maoist threat, backchannels negotiations between Maoist Chief Prachanda and King Gyanendra continued right through the insurgency. The king also believed, again erroneously in retrospect, that Nepalis would back his coup as they were sick and tired of the same corrupt and self-serving political leaders taking turns to rule the country.
He miscalculated on all three fronts. Royal Nepal Army, which the king headed, was certainly a capable fighting machine and the army alone (besides the two police forces) vastly outnumbered the Maoists, both in terms of personnel and weapons. But this was not a conventional war. The hit-and-run tactics of Maoist guerillas, who were designated 'terrorists' at the time, greatly frustrated the military. They didn't know how to fight an invisible enemy that could materialize seemingly out of nowhere to raid their installations. The monarch soon found out that complete defeat of the Maoists would not be easy.
Nor did his plan to woo the Maoists pan out. The Maoists understood that Gyanendra was an unpopular king. A political settlement with him, as such, would have badly discredited the Maoist movement, for in that case they would most certainly have had to give up on their central demand of Constituent Assembly. So as King Gyanendra continued to push away democratic forces, the Maoists saw more and more sense in aligning with the democratic parties against the king.
These are the political dynamics that Kamal Dev Bhattarai explores in his new book Sankramankal ('Transition'), starting with the signing of the 12-point agreement between the seven party alliance and the warring Maoists in New Delhi in 2005. Bhattarai, a long-time reporter on various Maoist parties, has a good understanding of the nitty-gritty of the peace and constitutional processes, something that comes out clearly in this book. He knows what he is writing about.
For those not familiar with the course of the political transition in Nepal, this book offers a concise history: of what happened and when. It will also serve as a reminder for those who closely followed the Maoist conflict but have forgotten the important events along the way.
It would have been better still if Bhattarai had put in more effort to edit the book. Often the timeline can be a little hard to follow as he tends to jump between events. The strength of the book, its brevity, its succinct treatment of transition, is also, in a way, its signature flaw as the author has had to leave out a lot.
biswas.baral@gmail.com
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