The unchanging nature of Nepal's society, culture, and politics is abundantly clear from the new draft constitution that took nearly a decade of outsized commitment of money and manpower to get ready. The thrust of the draft constitution could have been no different had it been put forth by Rana regime or Panchayat supremacists.
This perception of the draft ensues from a complete denial of the country's immense diversity and regional differences and sole focus on retaining the ethnic power structure established when the Nepali state was founded over two centuries ago. The government system then and now has barely moved from its centrist and ethnic orientation that turns half of country's citizens into a stateless entity: an invisible mass of humanity having no connection to government or institutions it supports.
This characterization of the country's modus operandi applies most to its treatment of Madheshi residents who haven't known of the state except through the presence of non-Madheshi security forces and government personnel in the region who guard their towns and villages, provide security at public places, and look after administration works. Madheshis do not have opportunities for gainful employment beyond self-employment in agriculture and petty trades. Government doesn't publish regional income data but looking at income earning opportunities available to Madheshi citizens, they, as a group, account for no more than 15 percent of national income, far below their 50 percent population strength.
The challenge for the current administration (as well as the past ones) is to narrow this divide and do away with malpractice that had been sustained all these years. But nothing has changed to soften the edges of ethnic and regional discrimination, much less has there been a well-intended effort to do away with it entirely. Despite decades of democracy and drive for civil liberties, Madheshis haven't experienced any state benevolence and they remain deprived and isolated from mainstream politics and economics. Ethnic inclusion and accommodation has been resisted in all ways possible, including in the drafting of the much-hyped republican constitution.
Constitutional subversion
The new constitution was meant to change all that—to give Madheshi population a fair share in the governance, starting with the establishment of federal states with sufficient degree of self-rule and a measure of autonomy. In the background of centralized rule of the country throughout its modern history, reaching an agreement on federalism was a remarkable achievement. But the agreement offers no more than a half-cooked solution to Madheshi grievances that underpin the current Madheshi protests against new constitution.
Of the seven provinces proposed, six have mixed territories, comprising Madhesh and hill regions which, however, wasn't intended—much less agreed upon—in the initial proposals on making of federal states. Madheshi leaders, in particular, have been adamant from the beginning about one, single Madhesh state made only of plain regions. Later there was a compromise on more than one Madhesh states but even these comprised only Madhesh districts.
The commonly accepted view of zonal-type north-south divisions of the country by Panchayat rulers was aimed more at consolidating the Pahade power at the local level in Madhesh. In fact, zonal administrations were all Pahades, just like central administrators. Almost all local-level government representatives were also Pahade natives. Rightfully, then, Madheshi leaders feared that any such mixture of plain and hill regions in forming of new federal states will further alienate Madheshis from local administration.
Genie is out
There is no indication that Pahade leadership—regardless of their political inclinations —is prepared to concede Madheshi demand of all-Madhesh state, one or more than one. If this is done, they fear, that will loosen their centuries-old grip on Madhesh and deprive them of sustenance from this resource-rich region. In fact, since ages, Madhesh has been used as a 'probing ground' by Pahade population, both as a source of government jobs and personal wealth as owners of real estate, and business and service enterprises. The government is aware of the calamitous situation.
But the Madheshi tide now looks unstoppable, whatever way the Pahade leadership responds to the unfolding events in Madhesh. Of course, the use of force is their first line of defense for which, unsurprisingly, it has been preparing for years. Reportedly, of some 200,000-strong security contingent made up of Army, Police, and Armed Police Force, as much as 90 percent are stationed in Madhesh, in effect turning the region into a Pahade garrison. Given the extent of polarization, Madheshi masses confronting a well-armed Pahade force with intention to kill has the same potential of conflagration as when Bangladeshi masses fought the Khan soldiers of Pakistan in the early 1970's.
Whether India wants it or not, it can't remain a spectator in Madhesh. It is likely to intervene, for its sake as well as for saving Nepal. India wouldn't sit on its hands if a million (or more) Madheshi people cross the border and become refugees. Pakistan lost East Bengal because of the refugee problem that its actions had created for India. Nepal government's current stance on Madhesh problem will be no less problematic for India and will merit an equivalent response.
It is most unlikely that Pahade leadership will pursue such destructive adventurism. Most likely, they will compromise on Madheshi terms—for a geographic delineation of the country with distinct Madheshi and Pahadi states. The most preferred option will be to go back to Rana regime's choice of regional boundaries carved out into four geographic zones, giving them a neutral labeling as Eastern and Western Madhesh and Eastern and Western Hills.
With the four provinces' boundaries coming together at a central point, this will yield to a balanced state-based separation of regions, balanced in terms of population-size, natural resources, and, most importantly, ethnic cohesiveness. Unless Pahade leadership is hell-bent on colonial rule of Madhesh, geography-based four-province model will help minimize conflict. Each region would then compete on equal terms, harnessing its special advantages, and tapping their resources. But this won't happen so long as the Pahade leadership remains stuck with a command-and-control politics anchored in medieval mind-set.
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